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EBAY SELLERS AND ARTICLE 2:
SELLING A BROADER MERCHANT
CONCEPT
I. BACKGROUNDINTRODUCTION
Right now, there is a man in Thailand who is auctioning on Ebay a
foot-long insect mounted on a glass frame. No one in Thailand is in-
terested in purchasing the insect; in fact, the Sipyloidea sipylus, as it
is taxonomically referred to, is pretty much everywhere. The market
for this insect is farther away; he will probably sell his etymological
knickknack to someone in the United States for around $15.00.1
At the same time, much closer to home, a Texas woman auctions
around twenty pairs of used sunglasses a day. She ships the glasses to
people all over the United States. She started listing the glasses on
Ebay as a hobby, but she now sells so many that her sales provide her
with almost as much income as her full-time job.
Transactions like these now account for around forty-eight billion
dollars a year on Ebay alone.2 The Web site now boasts more than
one-hundred million registered users.3 And people spend more time
on Ebay than any other Web site on the internet.4 The users are all
over the world and many operate significant online businesses.5 The
company bills itself as "the world's online marketplace."6 And it truly
is.
As Ebay has become an increasingly robust market, the number of
sophisticated sellers has grown in lockstep. There are now almost a
I One such walking stick is on file with the author. His wife considers the mounted curio
gross and weird.
2 Press Release, Ebay Inc., Ebay Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2005 Fi-
nancial Results (Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://investor.ebay.com/releases.cfm (noting that
the gross market value of all items successfully sold on Ebay during its fourth quarter in 2004
was twelve billion dollars). Ebay is not the only successful internet auction Web site, despite
what the company would like us to believe.
3 Ebay Company Overview, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/thecompany/company-
overview.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
4 Id.
5 Press Release, supra note 2, at 2 (reporting net revenues from the international market-
places to be comparable to the domestic revenues and increasing at a staggering rate).
6 Ebay Company Overview, supra note 3.
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million people who rely on Ebay as their primary or secondary source
of income.7 An additional 1.5 million people claim that they do not
rely on Ebay sales as a source of income, but do use it to supplement
their income. 8 These Ebay auctioneers are in many ways more analo-
gous to professional sellers than to people who hold a single garage
sale each spring, not only because of the volume of goods they sell,
but also because of how they present themselves. Under Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code), professionals are
held to slightly higher performance standards than everyone else.
People who regularly sell goods through online auctions are well
equipped to comply with these standards. Many of these sellers would
be merchants by extrapolation from existing law; others, who should
be, are not.
This Comment argues that this new class of not-so-casual sellers
should have merchant status for all of the Code's provisions and that
doing so would make online auctions a "better" marketplace. After
providing a brief overview of the context in which the question arises,
this Comment evaluates the practical effects of the merchant dichot-
omy on an Ebay transaction and concludes that the implied warranty
of merchantability included in section 2-314 is the only merchant
provision that would have a direct, material impact on online sales.
Applying the implied warranty of merchantability to sales by Ebay
auctioneers not only makes sense, but is supported by the text of the
U.C.C. and the drafting history. Finally, this Comment examines
some of the potential ramifications of this classification.
II. WHEN AND WHERE THE U.C.C. APPLIES: THE GOODS TO THE
DOWNRIGHT WEIRDS ...
The U.C.C. was promulgated in 1951.9 It replaced a number of
uniform laws that had been enacted across the country, which in turn
replaced the Danielic chaos of pre-statutory commercial law.' 0 The
Code reorganized the law of commerce using the sale of goods as the
foundation, based on the logic that "every phase of commerce... is
but a part of one transaction, namely, the sale and payment for
7 Press Release, Ebay Inc., New Study Reveals 724,000 Americans Rely on Ebay Sales
for Income (Jul. 21, 2005), available at http://investor.ebay.com/releases.cfm.
8 Id.
9 General Comment of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute to the Uniform Commercial Code (2000), reprinted in
SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 16-17 (Carol L. Chomsky et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter
General Comment]. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C. or Code) are to the 2000 Official Text and Comments.
10 Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 FLA. L. REv. 367,
367-68 (1957).
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goods."'" The Code aggregated a body of law that was "extremely
scattered" and was expensive to "the business man . . . because of
[its] uncertainty."1 2 And it did so with the hope of making the law
more clear and reasonable while allowing for reasonable adjustment
and growth.
1 3
Every state in the union has adopted the U.C.C., so it now governs
virtually all of the transactions on Ebay and other internet auction
sites. 14 Generally, there are only two limited circumstances in which
Article 2 would not apply to sales facilitated by online auctioneers.
First, the seller could include a provision in the posting, which is the
basis for the auction, specifying that another body of law will govern
the transaction. By bidding, the buyer might be agreeing to this
term. 15 In most situations, the Code grants to the counterparties the
freedom to contract.' 6 And this might include agreeing that the laws
of a foreign jurisdiction should govern the transaction.1 7 Second, and
perhaps more importantly, Article 2 applies only to transactions in
"goods"; while that term is broadly defined in Article 2, section
105(1), it would not include services and other intangibles. Thus,
while online auctions purporting to sell a "ghost" or an e-mail con-
taining "the secrets of the pirates of the Caribbean" would not be cov-
ered, virtually everything else sold on Ebay would be.1
8
n General Comment, supra note 9, at 17; see also Llewellyn, supra note 10.
12 Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 779 (1953).
13 Llewellyn, supra note 10, at 370, 80.
14 Caveat: while Louisiana adopted much of the Code, it never adopted Article 2 or
Article 2A. Ebay's User Agreement specifically states that it does not "modify the governing
provisions of California Commercial Code § 2401(2) and Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
401(2), [which] will govern" the transaction. Ebay User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.comlhelp/
policies/user-agreement.html (last visited May 24, 2006). Moreover, while many international
sales of goods are governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), the treaty does not apply to goods sold at auction. United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 2(b), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
15 Unlike traditional transactions in which the counterparties typically negotiate the terms
of the transaction, choosing the governing law in an online transaction might be possible if the
seller clearly specified that the buyer would be ratifying or agreeing to have the transaction
governed by his choice. However, whether this would be effective to bind the counterparties
presents an interesting question, because there is an argument that "the parties" are not truly
agreeing to these not-dickered-for terms.
16 U.C.C. § 1-105 (2000).
17 Section 1-105 allows choosing another jurisdiction's laws provided it bears a reason-
able relation to the jurisdiction of the transaction. Id. § 1-105. While the 2005 revision elimi-
nates the reasonable relation requirement, no state has adopted it yet. U.C.C. § 1-301 (2005).
18 The wide variety of things for sale on Ebay is truly shocking. For example, there are
apparently people who buy and sell murderabilia and votes. Marcia Stepanak, Making a Killing
Online, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 20, 2000, at EB84 (reporting that an inmate on death row has sold
parts of his body through an auction and that votes have been sold). There are also a number of
Web sites that track the unusual items for sale. E.g., WhatTheHeck.com, Ain't Capitalism
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III. ALL BUT ONE OF THE MERCHANT PROVISIONS HAVE NEGLIGIBLE
IMPACT IN THIS CONTEXT
Article 2 applies to all "sellers" and "buyers" of goods, whether
they are merchants or not. It makes no difference whether the coun-
terparties think of themselves as merchants, consumers, or pitiable
schlubs: when goods are being sold, Article 2 governs. However, the
Code has a handful of special rules for parties it classifies as "mer-
chants." When a party satisfies a provision's merchant criteria, a
heightened standard applies in addition to the rules that apply to eve-
ryone else.
Section 2-104(1) defines "merchant" as "a person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction." Interpreting the explicit language of the definition
and the comments thereunder, the courts have provided many differ-
ent definitions of the term "merchant."1 9 In order to determine
whether a party has merchant status under section 2-104, it is neces-
sary to examine the relevant code section.20 For the purposes of inter-
net auctions, the nuances of the various definitions have only limited
relevance, because there is only one merchant provision of any sig-
nificant impact: the implied warranty of merchantability. The other
provisions are either not implicated or largely irrelevant.
Three provisions applicable to merchants are not implicated in this
context. One is the statute of frauds, which requires merchants to re-
spond to confirmations of contracts or be barred from claiming that
the contract is not enforceable for lack of a writing.21 Because the
internet posting that serves as the basis for internet auctions satisfies
that section's requirements,2 the statute of frauds is not implicated.
Another inapplicable provision is section 2-209(2), which provides a
heightened obligation for merchants who wish to contractually pro-
scribe oral modifications to their agreements.23 In the context of
internet auctions, the agreement is consolidated in the posting and
Grand?, http://www.whattheheck.comlebay/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2006) (compiling a
number of odd auctions, including a nerdy seventeen-year-old boy trying to sell his virginity).
19 Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 747, 779 (1983).
20 Id.
21 U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2000).
22 The Code's definition of "written" would include the postings as well as any e-mail cor-
respondence that might be used to contact a seller in an effort to consummate the transaction in
some other way. Id. § 1-201(46).
23 Id. § 2-209(2).
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separate agreements and signings are largely impossible. While it
may be possible to acquire a separate signing from a potential bidder,
the bidder has no motivation for agreeing to, or signing, such a term
after a potentially binding offer has been posted online. Finally, the
merchant distinction incorporated into section 2-207(2) makes little
practical difference, because the rule applies only to communications
between merchants that do not materially alter the contract. Many
courts have liberally interpreted the merchant concept for purposes of
section 2-207(2); to the extent that a distinction still exists, however,
it is eliminated in the most recent, though not yet adopted, version of
the Code.24 In these three provisions, the merchant distinction is inap-
plicable to online auction sales; two provisions, however, are impli-
cated but have negligible impact: risk of loss and good faith.
Risk of Loss
The merchant distinction included in the risk of loss rules has
little, if any, practical effect on Ebay sellers. The risk of loss rules
address which party will bear the loss when goods are stolen,
damaged, or destroyed between the time when the auction is finalized
and the time when the purchaser actually receives the merchandise.
The drafters of the U.C.C. radically changed the law in this area. The
primary drafter, Karl Llewellyn, chose not to focus on hypertechnical
notions of when title transfers from seller to purchaser; instead, he
argued that sales are "complex structures of certain part-way stages
occurring... frequently between" the time property leaves the hands
of one person and enters the hands of another 25 As such, the Code
"adopted a system that allocates the risk of loss based on which party
has control of the goods, which party is more likely to insure the
goods, and whether a party has breached the contract.
26
On the most general level, the Code distinguishes between con-
tracts that require delivery of the goods and those that do not. In the
case where the goods do not have to be delivered, e.g., when the pur-
chaser will collect them from a showroom, the Code has a separate
rule for merchants.27 With a merchant seller, the risk of loss passes
from the seller to the buyer when the buyer actually receives the
goods.28 For example, if someone stole a television from a Best Buy
24 U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005).
25 K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725,730-31 (1939).
26 Seth Gardenswartz, The Risk of Loss in Electronic Transactions: Vintage Law for 21st
Century Consumers, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 15, 15 (2001).
27 U.C.C. § 2-509 (2000). This distinction is eliminated in the newest draft of the Code.
U.C.C. § 2-509 (2005).
28 U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (2000).
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loading dock, before it could be loaded into the purchaser's car, Best
Buy, as a merchant seller, would incur the loss and not the consumer.
For a non-merchant seller, on the other hand, the risk of loss passes
"on tender of delivery," i.e., when the goods have been made rea-
sonably available to be picked up.2 9
An Ebay transaction generally calls for delivery of the goods and
is thus governed by section 2-504, which makes no merchant/non-
merchant distinction.30 Transactions that occur through Ebay almost
invariably include an agreement that the goods will be sent via a ser-
vice like United Parcel Service (UPS) or traditional mail; the Code
calls this type of agreement to deliver the goods a "shipping con-
tract."3' The provision that handles shipping contracts does not in-
clude a merchant distinction. In a shipping contract, the risk of loss
passes when the seller delivers the goods to the carrier. 32 This risk of
loss rule is not well suited to internet auctions. The seller, who can
easily prove the existence and quality of the goods, is in a better posi-
tion to insure the goods than the buyer; in fact, modern shipping ser-
vices generally allow only the sender to insure the goods. Despite this
practical problem, there is little difference between an Ebay transac-
tion and other long distance sales, such as mail order purchases: the
criticisms of the rule would be the same.33 Regardless, the merchant
distinction contained in the risk of loss provision is virtually irrele-
vant to Ebay transactions.
Good Faith Standard
The heightened standard of "good faith" imposed on merchants
also has little practical effect on Ebay transactions. Merchants and
non-merchants alike have a standard of "honesty in fact," 34 which is
29 Id.
- Id. § 2-504.
31 In the unusual circumstance in which this is not the case, it is probably because the
seller does not regularly sell goods via the internet, i.e., would not be considered a merchant,
and is unable or unwilling to ship a large item through the mail.
32 U.C.C. § 2-509 (2000). In the event that a buyer is picking the goods up from the
seller's place of business rather than having them shipped, risk of loss does not transfer until the
buyer actually receives the goods. Note that this implicates the merchant definitions, too-
tender vs. delivery difference.
33 There is a significant amount of scholarship criticizing the risk of loss rules when non-
commercial goods are shipped. E.g., Gardenswartz, supra note 26, at *34; R.S.G., Note, Risk of
Loss in Commercial Transactions: Efficiency Thrown Into the Breach, 65 VA. L. REv. 557
(1979).
- U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2000). While merchants have always been held to an objective test,
which asks whether a reasonably prudent person would have acted the same way, non-
merchants' conduct has generally been tested under a subjective test. JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 521 (5th ed. 1995).
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imposed on all contracts through section 1-203. 35 However, in
addition to requiring "honesty in fact" from merchants, the Code also
requires them to observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade. 36
From a conceptual or academic standpoint, the different standards
of good faith are relatively easy to understand. "Honesty in fact" is a
subjective standard. It is an examination of what someone actually
believed and whether they intended to disfavor someone else. On the
other hand, "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" is a
phrase that encompasses both an objective and a subjective standard.
It is an inquiry into whether the seller conformed to the standards of
whatever trade they are engaged in.37 From a practical perspective,
these differences are difficult to implement and analyze; juries
struggle with the distinction.38 Further, courts have interpreted the
subjective standard of "honesty in fact" to include some objective
component. 39 The practical difficulties of determining what these
standards mean has blurred the distinction between the subjective and
objective tests, effectively making them both applicable to merchants
and non-merchants alike. Perhaps partially for this reason, the newest
draft of the Code makes the heightened standard universally
applicable.
IV. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY SHOULD APPLY
TO THIS NEW BREED OF ENTREPRENEURS
"There is no more puzzling a question than what this word
[merchantable] means."40
There is one merchant provision that remains unchanged by the
most recent revision of the Code and is significant to Ebay
auctioneers: the implied warranty of merchantability.41 While the
other merchant provisions would have little impact, applying the
implied warranty of merchantability to Ebay auctioneers would have
a significant positive effect on the online auction market as a whole.
35 U.C.C. § 1-203 (2000).
36 Id. § 2-103(1)(b) & cmt. 2.
37 James J. White, Revised Article I and the Warranty Provisions of Amended Article 2,
3 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 519,525 (2005).
38 Id.; Int'l Harvester Co. v. Glendenning, 505 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App. 1974) (overturning
a jury's decision that a defendant who admitted to lying and falsifying documents in connection
with the purchase of tractors had acted in good faith).
39 E.g., WiLLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 227-28 (5th ed. 2004).
40 Karl N. Llewellyn, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 324 (1930).
41 U.C.C. § 2-314 (2000).
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Whether they know it or not, many regular Ebay sellers are already
subject to this provision; those who are not, should be.
The warranty of merchantability applies to a subset of merchants,
often referred to as "dealer-merchants." Section 2-314(1) states that
the warranty is implied when "the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. 4 2 But this language needs considerable interpreta-
tion. Section 2-104 defines a "merchant" as any "person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved. 4 3 Construing the two provisions together, courts often inter-
pret that the warranty attaches only when the seller "deals in goods of
the kind."" And even courts that construe the second clause more
broadly never use it as a basis for affording a litigant merchant status.
However, becoming a "merchant with respect to the goods" should be
possible both legally and practically when "you hold yourself out" as
a dealer.
By any construction of the Code's language, conventional stores
and vendors, i.e., merchants of common parlance, are included; thus,
the warranty is implied in almost everything people purchase from a
traditional store. For example, the proprietor of your local hardware
store is a merchant as to all of the screwdrivers, fertilizer, etc. she
sells. 45 Your local hot dog vender would also be a merchant as to the
epicurean delights she hocks from her cart. On the other hand, a
"dealer merchant" would not include a person making an isolated
sale.46 For example, a farmer who is selling a single litter of dogs
would not be a merchant despite selling the dogs to a number of dif-
ferent people.47 And a person who sold and installed parts for a lob-
ster holding system might not be a merchant as to the assembled
product.48 By making this distinction, the Code is attempting to dif-
42 Id. § 2-314(1).
43 Id. § 2-104(1).
44 E.g., Allen v. Nicole, Inc, 412 A.2d 824, 825-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (hold-
ing that the sales aspect of a business needs to rise to a business itself in order to be considered a
merchant under section 2-314 and noting that "such specialized knowledge or skill" only applies
when professionals, like plumbers, sell goods in the course of performing a service); Import
Traders, Inc. v. Frederick Mfg., 1971 WL 17892 (Md. Super. Ct. 1971) (holding that the seller-
importer was not a merchant because it did not deal in goods of that kind).
45 Of course, the behemoth specialty stores would be merchants to the goods they sell as
well.
46 U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 3 (2000).
47 Nuijens v. Novy, 543 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Just. Ct. 1989).
4 Desmarais v. Sciola, No. CV-97-279, 1998 Me. Super. LEXIS 153 (Super. Ct. June 17,
1998) (holding that whether the seller of the components was a dealer merchant as to the entire
holding system presented a genuine issue of material fact).
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ferentiate between a "professional" and a "casual or inexperienced
seller or buyer.,
49
Historically, the courts have not had to address the possibility of a
seller holding himself out as a merchant without that actually being
true. Sellers with a physical storefront quickly become dealers as to
the goods they sell, or they go out of business.50 But the possibility of
a "hollow storefront," i.e., a store that is not a dealer in goods, is
much greater online, where opening and operating a virtual business
involves negligible cost: it is now possible to maintain a "store" with-
out consummating even a single sale. The scant guidance provided by
existing court decisions indicates that how the seller presents himself
is of little importance.
At least one court has intimated that an implied warranty of mer-
chantability might attach from the opening day sale, no matter how
little the proprietor understands about the good or how many goods
have been sold.5' Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion,
if they choose to address the question at all.52 The primary authority
for not attaching an implied warranty of merchantability, even if
seller "holds herself out" as a professional, appears to be Official
Comment 2 to section 2-314, which reiterates that a person who
makes "an isolated sale" is not a merchant.53 But that fleeting and
circular statement hardly addresses the question head on.
Section 2-314's language should not only afford merchant status to
anyone "who deals in goods of the kind," but also to anyone who "by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods. ' 54 Under the latter clause, Ebay auctioneers
could be afforded dealer-merchant status based on how the Web site
classifies them and how they market themselves. Two ways in which
Ebay categorizes sellers on their Web site signals that merchant-
49 U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 1 (2000).
50 Hillinger, supra note 19, at 782 (noting that this category of sellers might not even
exist).
51 Golden Needles Knitting & Glove Co. v. Dynamic Mktg. Enters, 766 F. Supp. 421,
428 n.6 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (noting in a footnote that the defendant's argument that it was not a
merchant was undermined by the way it presented itself in its correspondence); Musil v.
Hendrich, 627 P.2d 367, 372 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (assuming that the implied warranty of
merchantability would attach if the defendant held himself out as a hog farmer, but affirming the
trial court's decision that any such warranty had not been breached).
52 Fred J. Moore, Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a
seller of mint root was not a merchant when it sold mint oil for purposes of the implied warranty
of merchantability); Musil, 627 P.2d at 372 (noting that the trial court incorrectly decided that
the defendant was not a merchant-dealer despite selling a considerable number of hogs over the
years, but affirming the trial court's decision on other grounds).
53 U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 2 (2000).
5 Id. § 2-314 (emphasis added).
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dealer status would be appropriate. These designations include: Power
Seller and Ebay Store.
Ebay invites its members to become "Power Sellers" after they
have been an active member for ninety days, average a minimum of
$1,000 in sales per month for three consecutive months, and have a
high feedback rating from their customers.55 This designation is used
as a marketing tool to entice other customers. Similarly, the "Ebay
Store," one of the newer innovations to the Ebay Web site, is essen-
tially a virtual storefront that allows potential buyers to more effi-
ciently browse a seller's wares. Operating an Ebay store is as simple
as having a valid e-mail and bank account and paying the low
monthly subscription fee.56 Ebay now hosts more than 383,000 Ebay
Stores,57 which listed almost 73 million items for sale last year
alone.5
8
These labels are important because sellers use them to attract busi-
ness based on their purported expertise as to the goods, the Web site
itself, and the online auction selling practices in general. They broad-
cast to potential consumers that the seller sells significant amounts of
goods without qualifying exactly what those goods are. The labels
also separate Ebay auctioneers from someone who is using the Web
site casually. Anyone claiming to operate an "Ebay Store" or market-
ing themselves as a "Power Seller" is sufficiently "holding them-
selves out" as a merchant, so that merchant-dealer status should be
attributed to them.
The Effects of This Change
Assuming the merchant-seller has not effectively disclaimed the
implied warranty of merchantability, it attaches to all of the mer-
chant's sales; it is created whether the seller intended to make it or
not. When the implied warranty attaches under state law, sales of con-
sumer goods are also subject to reinforcing federal legislation. 59 The
Code enumerates certain attributes that set the threshold quality level
for merchantability. For one, the list specifies that, in order to be mer-
chantable, the goods must at least "pass without objection in the trade
55 Ebay, What Is a Power Seller?, http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsellwelcome.
html (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
56 Ebay, Open an Ebay Store, http://pages.ebay.comlstorefronts/start.html (last visited
Apr. 28, 2006).
57 Ebay Press Release, supra note 2, at 3.
58 EBAY INC., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2005).
59 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (2006).
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under the contract description." 60 The Code also states that they must
be at least "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used.",6 1 Many of the goods sold on Ebay would not satisfy these ba-
sic requirements. For example, I purchased a laptop power adapter
that stopped working three hours after it arrived in the mail.62 Almost
certainly, the adapter would not satisfy the criteria.
My legal recourse in regards to the power adapter, like any pur-
chaser, hinged almost entirely on whether the seller was a dealer-
merchant.63 If she was, she would assume the loss; if she was not, I
would be stuck with a useless power adapter and be out the purchase
price. But the merchant/non-merchant distinction is slightly more
complicated to apply to online sellers than to traditional sellers. Fur-
ther, the distinction makes little sense here, as discussed above.
Conventional Test Is Too Difficult To Apply
Applying the conventional test presents a slightly more compli-
cated problem in the Ebay context than in a more conventional sales
context. However, these problems and others would be lessened, if
not eliminated, if the merchant status could be gained by how the
seller presents themselves. One difficulty of applying the current rule
relates to determining which type of goods a merchant "deals" in, and
thus which goods carry an implied warranty of merchantability. On
one level, courts have been grappling with these hard decisions for
some time, and the problem is anything but novel. However, this new
medium exacerbates the already difficult problem of framing or de-
limiting the type of goods. 64
For a long time, courts have struggled to define what someone
"deals in" when faced with the sale of similar, but not identical,
goods.65 For example, should a part-owner in an antique business,
who often buys and sells prints, secondhand furniture, and china, be a
6 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (2000).
61 Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
62 I purchased the power adapter for the laptop I am currently writing this Comment on.
Also on file with author.
63 Arguably, unconscionability might provide some recourse in the most extreme cases.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000).
64 Compare Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that de-
fendant cattle farmers were not merchants because the sale to non-meat packers was a different
type of business than the sale of cattle to meat packers), with Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner,
321 So.2d 199 (Ala. 1975) (holding that while a cotton farmer might make an annual sale, he
was not a merchant for any of the Code's provisions).
65 E.g., Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971)
(holding a beer manufacturer not to be a merchant with respect to an isolated sale of carbon
dioxide to a soft drink manufacturer).
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merchant as to fine art or antiques?66 Should a dairy farmer's sale of
cattle include the implied warranty of merchantability only when the
purchaser will use the cattle in the same way as the farmer's typical
purchasers? 67 The answer is anything but clear and must depend on
the rationale for the distinction. Further, online auctions allow for an
unprecedented level of specialization, which compounds the difficulty
of answering these conundrums.
The modem interet auctioneer's closest analog might be tradi-
tional junkyards or secondhand stores. Unlike these businesses,
though, the online auctioneer can be highly specialized in one or more
types of goods. Before the online marketplace brought potential coun-
terparties together, niche businesses were extremely confined by geo-
graphic limitations. It was both difficult to inform the market about
your specialty, and difficult to actually do business with potential
customers. For example, a specialty book store generally only drew
on customers from its immediate locale. When these specialty busi-
nesses tried to sell to someone at a distance, it was typical to send
photographs via traditional mail. Now people looking to buy or sell
peculiar goods just have to go online. This increased specialization,
combined with the seller's ability to fluidly move from one product to
another, means that questions about what a seller deals in will more
frequently emerge.
Delineating what type of goods a seller deals in is also complicated
by the broader span of qualities that have independent markets in
online auctions. Modem products have so many component parts and
customer returns are so high that retailers recently began reselling the
returns with some modifications as "refurbished." Online auctions
facilitated the development of a massive market of these quasi-used
goods that includes consumer returns, off-lease products, products
with shipping damage, and overstocks.68 Unlike the traditional junk-
man or secondhand store, many sellers of goods on Ebay refurbish
goods or combine new and used parts to fashion a "new" product.
How courts approach these new questions of categorization will de-
termine not only whether the implied warranty attaches, but also the
related question of what the relevant measure is for determining a
breach.69
66 Spainerman Gallery v. Merrit, No. 00 Civ. 5712 (LTS)(THK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1444 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003) (holding that this issue presented a genuine issue of material
fact).
67 Fear Ranches, 470 F.2d 905.
68 See, e.g., James Stock, Thomas Speh & Herbert Shear, Many Happy (Product) Returns,
HIARv. Bus. REv., July 2002, at 16.
69 On many levels, these two concepts are interrelated. One interesting decision held that
components used in a machine that wrapped concreted pipe with wire could not carry the im-
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If the merchant distinction is designed to protect a buyer's reason-
able, unarticulated expectations about the quality of the goods, these
virtual storefronts should be considered merchants. 70 The average
consumer would not perceive that purchases for an online store are
inherently more risky, and the law should not enforce notions that
they are. On the other hand, if the rationale of the distinction is to
efficiently allocate loss, the answer is less clear. Unfortunately, there
is no consensus about why sales by merchants carry the implied war-
ranty and non-merchants are completely absolved.71
Rationale for the Section 2-314 Merchant Distinction
Nowhere in Article 2, or the rest of the Code, is there an explana-
tion of why the merchant dichotomy exists.72 For purposes of section
2-314, there is obviously some essential connection between the allo-
cation of loss and the seller's status. 73 But the rationale for the con-
nection is elusive. There appears to be no reason the implied warranty
should not apply to those who present themselves as merchant-
dealers, save perhaps an unwarranted affinity to outmoded notions of
caveat emptor.
Early courts approached the "warranty of merchantable quality" as
implied-in-fact but not fully expressed or originating in the agree-
ment.74 It was grounded in the concept that when a dealer sold goods
the "description obviously must be construed to call for the kinds of
goods usually sold by that name by such dealer., 75 That is to say,
"what is sold as 'waste silk' must be something known in the trade
and capable of passing in the market as waste silk.",76 This "inferen-
tial" warranty was expressly provided for in the English Sales of
plied warranty of merchantability because the components were of a "new" type in the industry.
Price Bros. Co. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
70 This argument assumes that expectations about online sales are no different. In the
unlikely event that the expectations are different, to the extent that the law forms the normative
perspective, it should still apply.
71 E.g., Hillinger, supra note 19.
72 Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt To
Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. LJ. 1141, 1143-45
(1985). There is a broad range of scholarship that discusses the motivations of the drafters as a
whole. E.g., Allen R. Kamp, Legal Development: Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl
Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context. 59 ALB. L. REv. 325
(1995) (arguing that the drafters, who were part of the legal realist movement, were motivated
by the progressivism of the New Deal era).
73 E.g., Hillinger, supra note 19, at 747.
74 William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV.
117, 126 (1943).
75 Id.
76 Id. (quoting Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46).
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Goods Act and later carried over into the Uniform Sales Act and to
the U.C.C.7 7 When the doctrine was first applied, the distinction that
limited the warranty to dealers probably reflected the fact that, before
the industrial revolution, goods sold by non-dealers were not fungi-
ble.78 Modem consumer goods, though, are almost all fungible, as a
result of assembly line production. A "brand new" power adapter
implies working condition in the same way that "waste silk" once
implied the inferior silk from the outside of the moth's cocoon.79 In-
deed, the implication of descriptions and categories in the modem
consumer market might carry more significance than it ever has, be-
cause selling fungible products in the post-mass-production era relies
heavily on brand name recognition and huge market volume. More-
over, the robust secondary market for quasi-used goods has created
more distinct quality levels.
Perhaps the most obvious, or infamous, modem rationale for the
implied warranty of merchantability is that it captures and enforces
the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. Both Dean
Prosser's remarks 80 and the drafters' official comments support this
rationale.8 ' Many recent court decisions have also adopted this
rationale when expounding section 2-314.82 But if the purpose of the
warranty is to protect consumers' reasonable expectations, and the
warranty does not attach to sales by non-merchants, the implication is
that purchasers of goods from non-merchants cannot have any
reasonable expectation that the goods will be of merchantable quality.
This must be true, because the provision precludes courts from
examining whether the goods were even of the most basic quality
level for non-merchant sales. However, sales by non-dealers are more
likely to include these implied warranties than their more experienced
and sophisticated merchant counterparts, because non-merchants
inherently have less experience crafting sales agreements.
If the rationale was to enforce expectations, the distinction would
also be superfluous, because unreasonable quality expectations are
not enforced by the Code.83 On the other side of the coin, if the law is
77 Id.
78 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT 189 (1909) (using the examples of grain and oil to explain the
term "fungible good"). Llewellyn conceived the Code as helping to distinguish the horse and
haystack from wares in commerce. K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle To Unhorse Sales, 52
HARv. L. REV. 873, 903-04 (1939).
79 See 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 958 (2d ed. 1989).
80 Prosser, supra note 74, at 125.
81 U.C.C. §§ 2-313 cmt. 1, 2-314 cmt. 7 (2000).
82 Hillinger, supra note 19, at 754-55 nn. 34-40.
83 Id. at 757.
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creating an expectation of increased risk, it is also creating a negative
economic consequence for sellers and society as a whole. Society has
an economic incentive to eliminate any reflection of increased legal
risk, because even the unwarranted perception creates downward
price pressure and this contributes to an inefficient allocation of
resources among the different markets. Perhaps more significantly,
these growing entrepreneurs would presumably not want to be
stigmatized by the notion that their products carry no warranty. 84
A final rationale for limiting the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity to dealers is that a dealer, more than a buyer, is generally a supe-
rior loss bearer and endowed with more information and control of
the product. This is probably true, but the same could be said for other
non-merchant sellers in this context. First, any seller is generally the
lower cost producer of information when the counterparties are geo-
graphically dispersed. Second, and perhaps more importantly, if an
Ebay entrepreneur holds himself out as a merchant, he should be held
to the standard of one and face liability for delivering non-
merchantable goods.
V. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE RAMIFICATIONS TODAY
The resilience of the Code is a testament to what Llewellyn mod-
estly described as "a rather amazing piece of legal engineering.
85
Imposing merchant status on Ebay auctioneers would not require any
change in the language of the Code or the Official Comments; it
would only change how the courts interpret them. And this alternative
interpretation may be a more correct reading of the current text.
The language originally proposed for the U.C.C. did not include
the merchant distinction; rather, it restricted the implied warranty of
merchantability to sales of new goods.86 However, before the final
draft, the used goods distinction was omitted from the comments to
section 2-314, and the "deals in goods of the kind or otherwise" lan-
guage was added to broaden the "merchant" definition in section 2-
104.87 Based on the current language of the Code, courts routinely
" This begs the question of whether there are different socio-societal considerations when
the counterparties are geographically dispersed. To the extent that there is societal pressure not
to corkscrew members of your own community, does the relative anonymity and distance of a
typical Ebay transaction eliminate it?
85 Hillinger, supra note 72, at 1164 n.153.
86 The comments to the 1949 draft read: "In contrast, a contract for the sale of second-
hand goods can involve only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods. A person making
an isolated sale of such goods would not be a 'merchant' within the meaning of the full scope of
this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply." U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 3
(Draft May 1949).
87 Hillinger, supra note 19, at 785-87.
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hold that the implied warranty only attaches when the seller actually
deals in goods of the kind and not "by virtue of holding himself out as
having knowledge or skill., 88 But this might be the wrong interpreta-
tion. Those sellers who hold themselves out as dealers should be held
to the standards of dealers.
In fact, the drafters might have conceived of including this group
as "merchants as to the goods," but the concept was so academic or
confusing that it was overlooked. 89 It has traditionally been almost
impossible to hold yourself out as a dealer in goods for any signifi-
cant period of time without actually selling anything. 90 White and
Summers interpreted the language to mean that sales by electricians,
plumbers, boat builders, etc. would include a warranty of merchant-
ability. 9' But those examples would generally be covered by the
dealer language, so perhaps the language should be given a much
broader construction. A broader construction would include not only
these sundry peri-professionals, but also anyone who "holds them-
selves out" as a dealer, no matter how many goods they actually sell.
For the purposes of Ebay auctioneers, this would include both Power
Sellers and Ebay stores.
Reading the text to impose this obligation would be completely
possible from a practical perspective. Other legal systems have a
similar implied warranty concept that attaches for all sales. For
example, both France and Germany prescribe a basic duty to deliver
merchantable goods on all sellers through their civil rather than their
commercial code.92 Many other countries also impose similar
standards.93
In the domestic legal regime, this interpretation might have some
positive indirect effects. Because the Magnusun-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975 (Warranty Act)
only applies to merchants, imposing merchant status on Ebay auc-
tioneers would bring many online transactions within its reach.94 The
88 E.g., Siemen v. Alden, 341 N.E.2d 713, 716 (11. App. Ct. 1975) (noting defendant's ar-
gument that plaintiff was a merchant "by virtue of his 'holding himself out as having knowledge
or skill."').
89 White and Summers would interpret section 2-104's second phrase, i.e., "otherwise by
his occupation," to include electricians, plumbers, boat builders, etc. for the purposes of the
implied warranty of merchantability. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 9-7.
90 This scenario could also be possible when parties represented themselves on paper to be
dealers, but in fact had no such experience, e.g., in a magazine or newspaper advertisement.
There appear to be no cases addressing this situation, but there is no reason to think that it
should be handled a different way.
91 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 9-7.
92 Hillinger, supra note 19, at 748 n.9.
93 Id. at 804-06. Perhaps the most notable difference in the regimes is the degree to which
they impose consequential damages.
94 Many of the consumer protection provisions included in the Warranty Act hinge on
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Warranty Act was intended to make warranties in consumer sales
more readily understandable and to provide an effective mechanism
for the comparatively small amounts of damages involved in such
cases.95 These are two significant concerns for transactors in the
online market.
Many agreements include deceptive warranty provisions. Right
now, more than twelve million Ebay offerings use the word
"warranty." Moreover, many offerings contain language like: "no
returns"; "buyer must notify the seller of defective goods within three
days"; and "goods must be returned directly to manufacturer." These
provisions and other like them are often inapposite to the actual law
and would be more closely scrutinized if a seller was a merchant.
Applying the Warranty Act would also ensure that a remedy existed
for intentionally deceptive trade practices. Finally, making these
sellers subject to the Warranty Act would provide the possibility of
efficient remedial relief for the small amount of damages often at
issue in these cases.96
Interpreting the text to afford Ebay auctioneers merchant status
might also help stave off the possibility of unnecessary and confusing
state regulation. Many states have proposed or passed legislation re-
quiring online auctioneers to become licensed, a process that involves
fees and instruction geared to traditional auctioning.97 Such legisla-
tion raises questions about who is covered. Would stores auctioning
goods for others auctioning goods online be covered? Is it necessary
for the purchaser to take title to the goods for the implied warranty of
merchantability to attach? The existing body of law is sufficient to
handle most concerns relating to Ebay transactions; additional legisla-
tion only makes resolving such concerns more complicated.
whether state law would include implied warranties. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (2006).
95 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer Product Warranty Acts § 1; Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc.,
513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
96 Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (reconciling
the Warranty Act and the Federal Arbitration Act in a dispute over problems with a mobile
home).
97 S.B. 99, 126th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2005); Ebay Fights Bid To Stop Fencing of Stolen
Goods, Bus. (London), May 29, 2005, at 9; Ted Griggs, La. Trying To License Ebay Traders
Who Sell Property for Other People, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 20, 2005, at I-A; Brad
Schrade, State Licensing Seen as Threat to Businesses that Depend on Ebay, TENNESSEAN, Apr.
5, 2005, at lB.
2006] 1215
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
While many people perceive the magnitude of internet transactions
to be small on a relative or absolute basis, that is not necessarily the
case. Many goods sell on Ebay for thousands of dollars: a large vol-
ume of expensive jewels, antiques, and computer hardware change
hands. A vast majority of these transactions are consummated without
incident, and by all accounts the platform is a great success; it is not
perfect, however, and problems will inevitably arise. A new sales
medium presents new ways to perform old crimes. For example, there
is now an enormous amount of fraudulent or "knock-off' goods sold
to unsuspecting purchasers. 98
Some of these problems have entered the case law, but many, per-
haps most, remain unreported by the courts and the media, or not pur-
sued by the victim. And with the benefit of a new sales medium, there
are inevitably new ways to perform old crimes. However, the prob-
lems are generally the same and appear to be adequately addressed in
our versatile body of sales law.99 Sometimes "[t]he pressure of the
times and of newer legal activities," as Llewellyn once described it,
simply requires examining our interpretation of the existing body of
law.1°
From a practical perspective, viewing Ebay auctioneers as
merchants has little impact. Most of the merchant provisions are not
practically implicated. Indeed, even the implied warranty of
merchantability's threshold quality level for goods sold would often
be subsumed by express warranties and disclaimers. Nonetheless,
how the law works in this area bears investigating, not only because
of its increasing importance, but also because it provides insight into
how to handle problems with online sales at large. Obviously, there
are many other entrepreneurs that hold themselves out as dealers on
the internet. Adding clarity and reason to how the law should function
98 Katie Hafner, Seeing Fakes, Angry Traders Confront Ebay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006,
at A22.
99 While a slightly different interpretation of these provisions would address many of the
concerns in this area of the law, how the law of personal jurisdiction is being applied merits
some attention to these multi-jurisdiction transactions. See, e.g., Fletcher Jones West Shara,
LTD. v. Rotta, 2006 Westlaw 231484; 31 Fla. L. Weekly D358 (Fl. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (affirm-
ing that defendant's misrepresentations incident to the sale of an automobile via Ebay afforded
the court personal jurisdiction).
100 Llewellyn, Why We Need the Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 367, 373 (1957).
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for Ebay auctioneers provide a framework for dealing with these
problems more generally.
ALEXANDER VAN VOORHEES t
t J.D. candidate, 2006, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to
thank the executive editors of this publication for their tireless and generally thankless work. In
addition, I would like to thank my fellow contributing editors-Dan Applegate, Jason Grove,
Kevin Pendergast, and John Titley (collectively, "Team Destruction")-for helping to make the
process of editing both entertaining and enlightening. Morriss Shanker's insightful feedback
was invaluable.
2006] 1217

